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U.S. Department of Justice

Environment and Natural Resources Division

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Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530



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TO:

Stephen Danzansky




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WDB 90-5-1-1-3343

Washington, D.C. 20530

March 20, 1991

TO: Richard B. Stewart
Assistant Attorney General

FROM: Bill Brighton
Environmental Enforcement Section

RE: Potential Assessment of Environmental Damage in Persian Gulf

This memorandum summarizes my initial thoughts and speculations on what it would take to perform an assessment of natural resource damages resulting from the oil spills into the Persian Gulf and the oil well fires in Kuwait, and what United States government personnel might be useful in performing such an assessment. Since I have only a news junkie's familiarity with the nature and scope of the environmental harm, and almost no idea of the amount of expertise and baseline data available locally in the Persian Gulf area, these thoughts cannot be presented as informed opinion.

Objectives of Assessment

I assume that the natural resource damage assessment would have three primary objectives: (1) to develop feasible plans to restore injured natural resources; (2) to produce action plans to alleviate economic and social hardships (including health effects) resulting from the air and water pollution, and/or alternative measures of compensation to the public for those hardships; and (3) to support claims for reparations against Iraq. The first of these objectives is identical to one of the primary thrusts of natural resource damage assessment under CERCLA or Section 311(f) of the Clean Water Act. I would expect the second objective to be significantly broader than in an assessment under U.S. law, because the U.S. law distinction between public losses and private losses seems less important in the Persian Gulf context and may be largely disregarded. In particular, I would think it is appropriate to seek government-to-government reparations for health effects and other widespread consequential harms that may be used for projects (such as improved respiratory health facilities) far beyond natural resource restoration, or that may even be redistributed in the end to affected individuals. On the other hand, I would jettison any notion of trying to estimate lost nonuse values, or even of using indirect economic methods to measure lost use values.

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I have not investigated the requirements for supporting a reparations claim under international law, but I assume that there will be a need to organize and summarize the results of the damage assessment in a manner presentable in a judicial or administrative forum.

General Scope of Effort

The best available yardstick for the oil spill component of this assessment is the Exxon Valdez case. In that case, the federal and State of Alaska governments have spent about \$80 million over a two-year period to evaluate injury from an 11 million gallon oil spill and, including restoration planning as part of the assessment, are roughly half done.

The Persian Gulf oil spills are probably larger than the Exxon Valdez spill, but I would expect an assessment of their effects to be similar to the Valdez assessment in terms of the scientific disciplines involved and the variety and depth of the scientific studies needed. On the other hand, at least two factors suggest that a Persian Gulf oil spill assessment could be done more efficiently. First, the Valdez experience has advanced the state of knowledge, at least among the agencies that participated in the assessment (and among the scientists and managers that performed comparable assessment work for Exxon), of (a) the effects of oil on the environment, and (b) how to study those effects. Second, there is no obvious reason for a Persian Gulf assessment to be performed under the veil of legal privilege that shrouded our scientific studies in Alaska; constraints imposed to preserve secrecy and privileges almost inevitably slow work.¹ Even with those mitigative factors, I would expect the bulk of the oil spill assessment to take about three to four years, with some studies continuing beyond that period, and to cost in the neighborhood of \$100 million or more.

In addition to the oil spill assessment, the Persian Gulf situation seems to call for an assessment of the effects of the oil well fires, for which I am unaware of any comparable precedent. EPA has developed models for estimating air pollutant distribution from individual industrial facilities, but I am skeptical that these would extrapolate well to the many high-load

¹ Regional politics could be a wildcard factor. In the Exxon Valdez case, it is fair to say that disputes and competing interests between the federal government and the State impeded the damage assessment to some extent. Depending on who has control over a Persian Gulf assessment, inter-government conflicts could either be a major impediment or a less important factor.

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sources in Kuwait. Moreover, a key aspect of such a study will be to assess the effects of deposition of air pollutants on the various soil conditions and vegetation over a wide area, and EPA's standard models would be of little help there. Perhaps more analogous would be studies of acid rain, and the studies that were performed of the distribution of radioactive gases and particles after the Three Mile Island accident or after the Chernobyl disaster. However, once an understanding is gained on the impacts of the oil well fires on the environment, the frontiers of science are likely to be pushed yet again to devise methods of mitigating those effects. In sum, I would guess that the scale of this effort could be as large as, or even larger than, the scale of the oil spill assessment: about \$100 million over at least a four- to five-year period.

Sources of Expertise

The agencies with the most expertise to offer for damages assessments of this type are NOAA and EPA. However, this would be a major departure from established duties for each of these agencies, and even in the domestic Exxon Valdez case, both NOAA and EPA showed considerable reluctance to divert their most skilled scientific resources to a novel effort. Moreover, since the Exxon Valdez injury studies and restoration planning are continuing, it is by no means clear that NOAA and EPA can spare precisely those individuals who have acquired the most experience in oil spill damages assessment.

NOAA has broad expertise on the effects of oil on marine resources and on methods to clean up spilled oil. NOAA and EPA are beginning to develop expertise on restoration of marine resources, although that art is in its infancy. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also has expertise on the effects of oil on marine life. The extent to which the expertise of any of these agencies is transferrable to the Persian Gulf is unknown.

NOAA also has what is probably the world's most advanced (non-military) atmospheric science program, and would be a likely source of wind pattern data and models to predict the dispersion of the smoke from the oil well fires. EPA's air and CERCLA programs possess expertise relevant to the toxicity of the air emissions to plant and animal life. EPA and the Department of Agriculture possess expertise on the effects of such air pollution on soil chemistry and crops.

cc: George Van Cleve

Re Dilsen

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PHONE: 267-0440

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
SITREP 34
18 MAR 1991

1. International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. Mr. Ostergaard, IMO representative, has relieved CAPT Luchun, USCG, as Chief IIAT. A strong international spirit of cooperation remains.

B. The holy month of Ramadan began 3/17. Muslims are required to fast from sunrise to sunset. The daily work schedule for cleanup ops is being modified to accommodate religious considerations. IIAT anxious to see if this holy month will impact negatively on cleanup efforts.

C. The Royal Commission is now taking a strong leadership role in cleanup ops. Combined ops in vicinity of Abu Ali Island are most professional with MEPA, Saudi Aramco, and the Royal Commission forces working together.

D. Donations of equipment from foreign governments continue to arrive. Not able to ascertain whether these government to government arrangements existed prior to new cooperative effort or if the new donations arranged without coordination with IMO. Concerns arising that IMO and diplomatic community of various IMO nations are working independently of each other.

E. MEPA has established cleanup project goals and seems emphatic about their importance. That goal is that during the next 45 days all efforts will be aimed at collecting all floating oil. Work will, whenever possible, be on a 24 hour basis. Upon completion of removal activities, all efforts will be directed at cleaning and rehabilitation of impacted beaches. Estimate between 416-460 km of shoreline w/complex geomorphology has received some form of impact (98% of available shoreline). Cleaning activities are to be integrated with national resource sensitivities to ensure that damage by cleanup ops and human presence will be minimized. Wildlife experts to play significant role in this phase of cleanup.

F. CAPT Luchun, USCG, and AIREYE rep traveled to Kuwait City to meet with members of U.S. Congressional delegation re: U.S. Activities.

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G. Team is continuing to assist with reorganization of cleanup ops organization and to provide technical advice as before. Focus is on the planning committee as they broach the issues surrounding logistics.

2. Other Government's Requests for Assistance:

A. No Additional Information.

3. Fish and Wildlife Issues:

A. Deep concern has been expressed over turtle nesting islands (Jena and Kuran Islands) approximately 12 km N-NE of Jubail-Abu Ali. These islands were recently declared National Wildlife Preservation Areas for an endangered species, Green Turtles. Islands are surrounded by sheen and accumulated marine debris will significantly impact availability of nesting sites and reproduction yield. RAF, Army of UK, and U.S. Marines graciously volunteered helo transport and manpower (volunteers) from local camp to provide environmental assault on islands. Ad hoc effort was magnificent. In two days islands of Jana and Karan cleaned of debris and access to turtle nesting pits greatly enhanced. Brits and U.S. Marines efforts greatly appreciated. Turtles seen in area.

4. International Efforts:

A. No Additional Information.

5. Spill Information:

A. Overflight 17 March 1991:

1. Areas identified on the map as "SLAR positive" indicate a positive signal on the Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) instrument, but surface oil was not always confirmed by visual observations.

2. The observations reported on this map are the result of yesterday's overflight from a Coast Guard SLAR. The Coast Guard SLAR covered the area from the coast out approximately 80 miles into the Gulf. The northern extent of the SLAR was the middle of Bubiyan Island, and the southern extent of the SLAR was the offshore region north of Qatar.

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
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3. Kuwaiti waters: A large sheen east of Bubiyan Island was centered around Al Bakr terminal. A sheen was reported trailing south of Faylakah Island, and several larger sheens were reported east of Mina Su'ud.

4. Saudi waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil are assumed to still be along the coast between Ra's al Ghar and Abu Ali Island (no observations were received today for this area). The SLAR indicated a patch of oil about 35 kilometers east of Ra's Tanura. An offshore sheen was also observed between Kurayn Island and Abu Ali that extended southeast to Jurayd Island.

5. Bahrain and Qatar Waters: The large sheen off Qatar was not seen yesterday.

B. Weather: (for western coastal areas of north central Arabian Gulf) Sunday through Thursday:

1. Winds will be WNW to NNW 3 to 5 kts at night, becoming N to NE 7 to 12 kts during the day.

2. Winds switching to the southeast and gradually strengthening.

C. Trajectory:

1. Kuwaiti waters: Oil will continue moving downcoast to the southeast due to the currents and moderate north winds over the next five days. Light beach impacts may occur between Mina Su'ud and Khafji from the nearshore sheens.

2. Saudi waters: The heavy concentrations of oil between Ras al Saffaniya and Abu Ali Island are expected to remain in that area, with continued tar mat formation as sediment is mixed with the already beached oil. The offshore oil east of Abu Ali is expected to approach the Saudi Arabian coastline between Ras Tanura and Jubayl. Light beach impacts may occur between Al Jubayl and Ras Tanura by Thursday, March 21, if the sheens do not disperse before then.

3. Bahrain and Qatar Waters: SLAR positive oil concentrations east of Ras Tanura may make landfall on the northern tip of Bahrain by Friday, March 22, if the oil does not disperse before then.

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
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18 MAR 1991

6. Future Spill Potential:

A. Concern remains over continuing sources of oil release in the northern Persian Gulf. There are several sunken tankships and two facilities which continue to release oil and several other potential sources. The SAG will officially request that the Government of Kuwait advise them when salvage/repair will take place, when chronic leakage will be abated, etc. The information is needed to bound their response problems and to plan for contingencies.

7. Other Pertinent Information:

A. No Additional Information.

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
SITREP 33
13 AND 14 MAR 1991

1. International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. Prince Sultan held a meeting with Aramco, MEPA, and the Royal Commission and has revised the organization established one week ago in which Aramco would oversee all cleanup ops. Now, MEPA has been directed to organize the overall response effort, as it had attempted to do previously. Aramco is to protect its own facilities and provide the cleanup logistics for all other areas at MEPA direction. MEPA OSC, Dr. Tawfiq, has directed that an organization be built that can effectively manage the response effort.

B. USCG personnel travelled to Manifa Bay and the Bays around Abu Ali Island at MEPA request to view the operations reported to be in progress and provide a briefing to MEPA OSC. Partial containment of free-floating oil has been achieved at Manifa Bay and recovery was in progress with vacuum trucks. All available boom was deployed but much oil remained uncontained. SE winds were holding the oil against the shoreline where it could easily be vacuumed. This is expected to change with forecasted NW winds. The oil which is not contained will again blow away. Saudi Aramco is overseeing this operation.

2. Other Government's Requests for Assistance: NTR

3. Fish and Wildlife Issues:

A. Don Kane (USF&WS) continued field assessments with the international environmental team on Abu Ali Island, specifically to assess impacts and remediation to mangroves. Videotaped various aspects of the area.

4. International Efforts:

A. John Ostergaard (IMO Rep) and CDR Schrinner (USCG) drafting proposals for IMO funded projects. John Ostergaard continues liaison for international involvement.

B. Operations at the Royal Commission area (Abu Ali area) are being conducted by the Royal Commission with contractors directed by OOPS, Inc. The Dutch contingent is also working in this area. Excellent progress is being made possibly because of the absence of the politics found at other areas.

C. The German contingent was placed in an extremely remote area with little oil, no diesel fuel, and no food, water, or

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lodging. When USIAT field assessment team arrived on scene, they were sitting in a small conex box. USIAT understands this contingent has contacted the German Embassy regarding this situation.

D. Aramco contractors arrived with a Norwegian consultant at the Abu Ali Island impact area. Aramco had instructed them to return to the relatively slightly impacted Saffaniya area; however, this contingent went to Abu Ali anyway to begin work on the extensive oil at the causeway connection to Abu Ali Island has yet to be contained. This oil continues to move about with the changing winds; this situation has been repeatedly reported to MEPA.

5. Spill Information:

A. Overflight 13 March 1991:

1. Today's observations are based on overflights from a Coast Guard AIREYE, and visuals from a Marine Corp helo, an Aramco helo, and a Saudi Arabian helo. The northern extent of the AIREYE was 29° 40'N and 49° 10'E; the southern extent was the north tip of Bahrain. The other helicopters flew over the coastline from Ra's al Ard, the southern entrance to Kuwait harbor, south, along the Saudi coast.

2. Kuwaiti waters: Oil continues to trail off Faylakah Island to the southeast. The near shore area between the border with Saudi Arabia and the entrance to Kuwait harbor is lined with numerous sheens and streaks of darker oil. The heaviest concentrations of oil appear to be between the north pier at Mina al Ahmadi and the village of Umm al Haiman.

3. Saudi waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil are still along the coast between Ra's al Ghar and Abu Ali Island. The AIREYE indicated an offshore patch of oil surrounding the islands of Harqus and Karan, a patch just east of Al Arabiyan, and a patch about 15 kilometers east of Ra's al Saffaniya extending to the northeast. Another patch of sheen with a few bands of brown oil was observed about 75 kilometers north of Bahrain extending to the southeast.

B. Trajectory:

1. Kuwaiti waters: Oil in the northern Kuwait waters will continue moving in a generally south to southeast direction down

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL

SITREP 33

13 AND 14 MAR 1991

the coast over the next six days. Beach impacts may occur at headlands and along most of the Kuwaiti coast toward the end of the forecast period (March 19-20) when winds are predicted to be from the ESE.

2. Saudi waters: The oil between Ra's al Saffaniya and Abu Ali Island is expected to remain in that area. Continued tarmat formation is expected as sediment is mixed with the already beached oil. The offshore oil extending from Hargus Island to north of Bahrain is expected to approach the northern tip of Bahrain and Qatar. Beach impacts may occur by Monday, 18 March, in both areas unless the slick disperses before then. The slick off Ra's al Saffaniya is expected to approach Ra's al Ghar and merge with coastal oil by 18 March.

C. Weather forecast: For western coastal areas of north central Persian Gulf.

1. Thursday: Southerly winds will diminish before switching to the northwest, 15 to 25 knots.

2. Friday through Wednesday: Generally northwest winds will slowly decrease during the period. Daytime sea breezes will be 10 to 15 knots, while nighttime land breezes will be 5 to 10 knots. A low should move eastward across the Mediterranean early next week causing winds to switch to the southeast and slowly increase.

6. Future Spill Potential: NTR

7. Other Pertinent Information:

A. U.S. air quality team arrived in Dhahran 11 March and were met by Captain Luchun and Jeff Hardy (DOE rep). Air team will be quartered in the Algo Saibi Hotel and working out of the MEPA office, same as the IIAT. Support to be provided by the American Consulate in Dhahran.

B. Absent substantially significant events, future Persian Gulf Spill Sitreps will only be prepared on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of each week.

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
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
From: CAPT William F. Holt, USCG
Chief, Marine Environmental Protection Division

14 Mar 91

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	D.O.S.	Bob Blumberg/ Tucker Scully Oil Spill Task Force-Scully/Blumberg	202-647-6610
	DOD Crisis Coord Center	Joe Muckerman	703-697-1920
	JCS Crisis Action Team	BGen John Jumper	703-697-4801
	USACOE EOC	Gary Campbell/ John Elmore	202-272-0378
	EPA Emerg. Ops Cntr	Jim Makris	202-252-0154
	IMO	CDR Pascoe	011-44-071-587-3238
	Canadian Coast Guard	Mr. Tom Ring	613-998-4168
	CAPT Viglienzzone	U.S. Coast Guard	703-693-6465
	U.S. Coast Guard Congressional Affairs	CAPT Hull	202-366-2351

Attached are two pages of oil spill overflight and trajectory analysis information.





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U N C L A S S I F I E D

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
SITREP 32
12 MAR 1991

1. International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. Presented videotaped footage of oil impact areas at Manifa Bay and Abu Ali Island during daily meeting. There was extensive interest by the various "experts", Government Agency reps, and Aramco reps who had not yet seen the oil spill. Presenting video footage and photographs depicting the limited cleanup activity at the nightly meetings may help emphasize the urgency of the situation and act as a catalyst for increasing the effort.

B. The relationship between MEPA and Saudi Aramco remains strained, though oil recovery is being accomplished. Saudi Aramco is mildly cooperative. MEPA, Royal Commission, National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development, and Prince Faisal scheduled to meet 3/13 with senior MEPA and Saudi Aramco officials to resolve management problems and organizational structure.

C. F&W rep completed field assessment and remediation proposal for Dowats Al Manifah and Bilbul.

2. Other Governments' Requests For Assistance:

A. No Additional Information

3. Fish and Wildlife Issues:

A. F&W rep briefed Japanese Delegation on wildlife concerns and plans.

B. F&W rep to conduct field assessment with the International Environmental Team on Abu Ali Island specifically to assess impacts and remediation to mangroves.

4. International Efforts:

A. USCG and IMO rep (Mr. Ostergard) discussed specifics of any proposal requesting IMO Trust Fund monies with IMO (London). Considering self supporting cleanup efforts in either Musallahmua Bay or an offshore island (Karan); also considering SLAR support and/or arrival photo mapping. Preparing proposals to IMO for use of trust funds.

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
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12 MAR 1991

B. German recovery team is now in the field. Should commence recovery operations in very near future.

C. CAPT Luchun, USCG, briefed the 15 member Japanese delegation on USCG activities to date. The Japanese have offered whatever assistance is requested. The SAG needs only to specify what they desire. Delegation is scheduled for overflight of the spill area today.

D. The Australian delegation has commenced work with Saudi Aramco. They have been assigned two areas of responsibility for presentation to the Saudi Aramco planning committee. Will meet with them today to discuss incorporating their efforts with IMO.

5. Spill Information:

A. Overflight 11 March 1991

1. Observation map is based on a morning Coast Guard SLAR and two helicopter overflights. The SLAR covered the area from the coast out approximately 80 miles into the Gulf, and the helicopter overflights covered the coastal waters of Saudi Arabia.

2. Kuwaiti waters: The large patches of offshore oil east of Mina Su'ud reported yesterday did not show up on the SLAR images today, due probably to a change in sea state. The SLAR did indicate oil trailing off Faylakah Island to the southeast, and smaller patches of oil to the east of Bubiyan Island, and northeast of Mina Su'ud.

3. Saudi Waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil are still along the coast between Ras al Ghar and Abu Ali Island. The SLAR indicated an offshore patch of oil surrounding the islands of Harqus, Karan, and Kurayn.

B. Spill Trajectory for 11 March 1991:

1. Kuwaiti Waters: Oil in the northern Kuwait waters (off of Bubiyan and Faylakah Islands), will continue moving in a generally southern direction into Tuesday, March 13. Then with strong southeasterly winds predicted for two days, oil will move toward shore between Ras al Khafji and Kuwait Harbor. If the oil offshore of Kuwait does not disperse, possible beach impacts may occur by Wednesday, March 13 around Mina al Ahmadi, and Mina Su'ud.

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
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12 MAR 1991

2. Saudi Waters: The oil between Ras al Saffaniyah and Abu Ali Island is expected to remain in that area. We would expect continued tarimat formation as sediment is mixed with the already beached oil. Oil offshore of Saudi Arabia in the Karan Island area will continue moving south of Abu Ali then toward shore with southeast winds. By Friday March 15, there is a possibility of beach impacts between Ras Tanura and Al Jubayl. This depends upon the accuracy of the long range forecast and the amount of oil that is in the offshore patches. If the offshore patches are primarily sheens we would not expect it to hold together long enough to impact the beach.

C. Weather Forecast:

1. Monday thru Tuesday: Winds N to NNE 12 to 17 knots becoming light WSW late evening and early morning. Winds will then increase in strength to about 20 kts from the ESE in the late afternoon.

3. Wednesday thru Sunday: Winds SE 20 to 25 kts into Thursday morning, March 14. Winds will then shift to the NNW 18 to 20 kts as a front moves through. Friday, winds will continue NNW at about 8 to 17 kts. Winds will shift to WNW late Friday and early Saturday as a land breeze develops. By late Saturday afternoon, winds will shift to the NNE then become SE at about 15 kts on Sunday as a new system approaches from the west.

6. Future Spill Potential:

A. No Additional Information.

7. Other Pertinent Information:

A. Absent substantially significant events, future Persian Gulf Spill Sitreps will only be prepared on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of each week.

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL

SITREP 30

08 MAR 1991

1. International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. Weather on-scene (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as far South as Dhahran) over the past 24 hours: winds northerly at 5-10 knots, temp 19C, Visibility 5 kilometers except in smoke where drops it drops to less than 500 meters.

B. Mr. Hebert of Alpha Environmental met with Dr. Tawfiq to report his observations. Believe Mr. Hebert attempting to expedite start of bioremediation test project - in essence to speed up the science committee. Advised Dr. Tawfiq to allow science committee to handle through established channels.

C. IIAT requested contact at CENCOMN to inquire if any KTF SITREPS contain references to oil situation in the area of Kuwait City/Bubiyan island. Any info in this area would assist in quantifying amount of oil that could impact the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia shoreline.

D. Don Kane (USF&WS) and LCDR Keane (USCG) conducted shoreline assessment at Dawhat Ad Dafi. Jay Rodstein (NOAA) accompanied two members of European Commission on a C-12 overflight in areas north of Khafji into KTO. CPT Hill (USACOE) obtained numerous detailed topographical maps of coastal areas to aid team in shoreline assessments.

2. Other Governments' Requests For Assistance: NTR

3. Fish and Wildlife Issues: IIAT planning C-12 overflight for Don Kane, CDR Schrinner (USCG) and two Saudi wildlife officials to do aerial survey of impact of oil on offshore islands.

4. International Efforts:

A. CDR Schrinner finalizing arrangements for arrival of IMO Representative, Mr. John Oostergard; scheduled to arrive Dhahran either, 8 March on standby booking from Jeddah or 10 March on confirmed booking.

B. German delegation to arrive 9 Mar. Dr. Tawfiq has indicated that German government will donate equipment, manpower and expertise. CG to participate in briefing activities.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
SITREP 30
08 MAR 1991

C. Japanese delegation to arrive on or about 11 March with party of over 14 including Director of Global Environment, Department of Environment. Mr. Fujiyama, Embassy of Japan, Riyadh, KSA, requests CG provide ops brief/air pollution activities brief. USIAT will provide.

5. Spill Information: 7 March 1991 (Persian Gulf Time)

A. Overflight

1. Kuwait to Saudi Arabia: Oil was again observed off Mina al Ahmadi, observers onboard SLAR aircraft were able to visually confirm streamers of heavier oil in the Mina al Ahmadi area as well as in the area just east of Faylakah Island. Small streaks of oil were identified on the SLAR just North of Bubiyan Island, approximately 2 miles into Khawr abd Allah.

2. Saudi Arabian waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil remain between Ra's al Tanaqib and Abu Ali Island. No oil was found on SLAR between the nearshore patch (that has been essentially in the same location over the last week) and approximately 30 miles offshore.

B. Spill Trajectory Update:

1. The overflight information over the past few days was hampered by the weather, today's overflight covered the area from the shoreline out approximately 30 miles. Since the offshore area was not covered in today's overflight, this trajectory includes the most recent information for offshore oil distribution (March 3, 4 and 5) as well as today's overflight.

2. Winds are forecast to be from the N, NNW, and NW through Tuesday. By late Tuesday or Wednesday, an upper level disturbance over the Mediterranean may lead NE, E and ESE winds. The oil in the nearshore regions for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is expected to continue impacting the shorelines of these countries, from Mina al Ahmadi down to Abu Ali Island.

3. Oil offshore of Saudi Arabia (last reported in the Karan Island area) will continue moving south, with the potential for impacting northern sides of islands as it transits the area. With the assistance of the easterly winds forecast for Tuesday and Wednesday (March 12 and 13), the oil may move into the area offshore of Jubail.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
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6. Future Spill Potential: NTR

7. Miscellaneous:

A. Meeting tentatively scheduled on Sunday 10 March with Colin Hendry (ROPME)/John Oestergard to discuss International Interagency Team Concept - roles/relationship etc. and possible use of IMO member country capability to replace SLAR A/C now being provided by USCG.

B. MEPA VP Dr. Tawfiq to depart for Jeddah Tuesday to attend to MEPA business; returning Friday 15 March.

C. MEPA preparing office spaces for MEPA air quality taskforce to co-locate in MEPA Command post. Dr. Tawfiq also intends to offer representatives of government of Kuwait the use of this facility.

D. After much discussion with Dr.'s Tawfiq/Olsen MEPA is now relaxing restrictions on press access to cleanup operations. DR. Tawfiq has had TV interviews with Japanese Public TV, 3/7; ABC News Special, 3/8. Belgian TV tentatively scheduled 3/9 or 3/10 to discuss spill ops. IAT awaiting National Geographic representative, Mr. Canby. USIAT have not had contact with National Geographic Editor to date.

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PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
SITREP 31
11 MAR 1991

1. International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. John Ostergard, Danish National Agency of Environmental Protection, has arrived and is being briefed regarding ongoing activities. CAPT Luchun, USCG, attempting to schedule a meeting between himself, Mr. Ostergard, and Mr. Hendry, (IMO representative to southern gulf states) to discuss an international team concept, its role and missions, and relationships.

B. Office space for U.S. Air Quality Team has been identified in Dhahran. Tentative meeting scheduled for 12 March between IIAT, KSA, MEPA, KFUPM, and U.S. Air Quality Team. Air Quality Team due 1700 Monday.

C. MEPA has installed a microwave comms system for contacting field personnel. System being checked out by IIAT personnel.

D. Reviewing MEPA list of equipment needs to be able to discuss IMO funding of these shortfalls.

E. Made contact with National Geographic editor - will provide overflight when schedule permits.

2. Other Governments' Requests For Assistance:

A. No Additional Information

3. Fish and Wildlife Issues:

A. Conducted C-12 overflight of offshore islands with wildlife rep to assess areas of shore impact. Results used to prioritize boat trips for beach impact within next two days.

4. International Efforts:

A. Provided assistance to German Attache with airport arrangements to recieve plane load of donated equipment.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL

SITREP 31

11 MAR 1991

4. B. CAPT Luchun, USCG, and Dr. Al-Gain met German Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the German Minister of the Environment. Conducted open briefing for official party. Delegation included members of international press, including CNN. Dr. Tawfig and Dr. Al-Gain conducted interview/briefing. CAPT Luchun, USCG, answered two questions at request of Dr. Al-Gain.

C. Discussed possibility of German SLAR plan for gulf operations. Passed issue to IMO for resolution.

D. CAPT Luchun, USCG, and Dr. Tawfig to meet with Japanese Delegation on 3/11. Will schedule overflight for them on 3/12.

5. Spill Information:

A. Overflight 10 March 1991

1. Today's observation map is based on two separate flights; a morning Coast Guard SLAR, and a U.S. Navy C-12. The SLAR covered the area from the coast out approximately 80 miles into the Gulf. The U.S. Navy C-12 observed the area around the offshore islands of Harqus, Karan, Kurayn, and Al Arabiyan. There was no coastal overflight done today, so the nearshore oil shown is based on yesterday's coastal overflight.

2. Kuwaiti waters: Sheens and mousse continue to be found on the northeast side of Bubiyan Island along with patches of oil north and southeast of Faylakah Island. The patches of oil east of Mina Su'ud remain. A small patch was reported about 10 miles to the northeast of Mina Su'ud with larger patches reported out to about 70 miles east of Mina Su'ud. These observations came from the SLAR overflight.

3. Saudi Waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil are still along the coast between Ras al Ghar and Abu Ali Island. The SLAR and the C-12 overflights continue to report offshore patches of oil out to about 60 miles between Saffaniyah and Abu Ali.

B. Spill Trajectory for 10 March 1991:

1. Kuwaiti Waters: Oil in the northern Kuwait waters (off of Bubiyan and Faylakah Islands), will continue moving in a generally southern direction into Tuesday, March 13. Then with strong southeasterly winds predicted for two days, oil will move toward shore between Ras al Khafji and Kuwait Harbor. If the oil offshore of Kuwait does not disperse, possible beach impacts may occur by Thursday, March 14.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL

SITREP 31

11 MAR 1991

2. Saudi Waters: The oil between Ras al Saffaniyah and Abu Ali Island is expected to remain in that area. We would expect continued tarmat formation as sediment is mixed with the already beached oil. Oil offshore of Saudi Arabia in the Karan Island area will continue moving south of Abu Ali with the northwest winds. Then during the strong southeast wind period the oil will move toward shore. By next Saturday, March 16, there is a possibility of beach impacts between Ras Tanura and Al Jubayl. This depends upon the accuracy of the long range forecast and the amount of oil that is in the offshore patches. If the offshore patches are primarily sheens we would not expect it to hold together long enough to beach.

C. Weather Forecast (3/10 - 3/17):

1. Sunday: Winds S 12 to 15 knots shifting to the N 20 to 24 knots in the afternoon. Visibilities lowering along the coast in dust, smoke, and haze.

2. Monday thru Tuesday: Winds NNW to NNE 8 to 17 knots. Visibilities continue to be lowered in smoke, dust, and haze. Smoke thicker and more concentrated at night when winds are weaker, particularly Tuesday.

3. Wednesday thru Sunday: Winds will begin to shift around to the SE and strengthen to 17 to 21 knots. Visibilities along coast will improve as smoke is blown inland and north. A front will move through the region early Friday and winds will shift to NNW 10 TO 16 knots and visibilities will lower in dust, smoke, and haze. Late Saturday, winds will shift NNE then to the ESE on Sunday.

6. Future Spill Potential:

A. No Additional Information.

7. Other Pertinent Information:

A. NOAA rep to do SLAR overflight analysis for Dr. Al-Gain to provide current data on spill size. Sense we'll be caught in numbers game. Over-emphasis being placed on spill volume estimates vice cleanup (apparently to justify costs) by Saudi government.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File: Osl
Smil!

Date: _____

TO:

FROM: **STEPHEN I. DANZANSKY**
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Director of Cabinet Affairs

Don Mykenda II.

Gen Sumi

staff of VC
assault team
to block

Bidone ~~025~~ tv

Jensen

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION



TELECOPIER COVER SHEET

TIME: 1732DATE: 2/22/91TO: STEVE DANZANSKY

PHONE: _____

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING
THIS PAGE: 3FROM: Bill HoltPHONE: 267-0518

SUBJ: THE ATTACHED IS EXCERPTED FROM A FAX I RECEIVED
FROM DON JENSEN REGARDING ALDHA ENVIRONMENTAL. IF YOU
NEED THE ORIGINAL FAX OR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE
CALL.

COMMENTS REQUESTED BY: _____

THE NUMBER FOR THIS FACSIMILE MACHINE IS (202) 267-4085

A special subcommittee of the Saudi Scientific Committee was established by Dr. Tawfiq to facilitate decisions on the use of bioremedial agents. The subcommittee is headed by Dr. Ibrahim Alam. Captain Jensen, USCG tasked LCDR Gary Petrae, NOAA and Dr. Peter Hinchcliffe (U.K. Department of Transport) to assist the subcommittee in their deliberations. The subcommittee has been meeting daily since February 16. Over 60 companies have submitted proposals for the use of biological agents, including over 45 from the United States.

The issue of full technical guidance mentioned in the first paragraph of Alpha Environmental's letter deserves some discussion. At their first meeting, the bioremediation subcommittee members expressed concerns about the efficacy, toxicity and threat system proposed by Alpha Environmental. They were requested to provide additional information addressing these concerns. Subsequent meetings were held to review additional information submittals and to work together to prepare a plan for a two-phase demonstration. Phase one was to be aquaria tests to measure effectiveness and toxicity of the Alpha Environmental system using oil from the Gulf slick. If the system was shown to be effective through chemical analysis in enhancing natural biodegradation, if no serious toxicity to marine organisms was shown and if additional information indicated that there was no threat to human health or the environment from the microbe culture, then it was proposed to conduct phase two-a small-scale field demonstration. Information was provided indicating potential toxicity hazards from the nutrient mix and from the bioremediation system overall. A limited amount of effectiveness data was provided. Phone conversations, at Alpha Environmental's invitation, with U.K. labs indicated that the effectiveness tests to date have shown limited effects and that the toxicity tests were inconclusive. Information was provided from the Chief of Pathology at a U.S. hospital that indicated the Alpha Environmental system bacteria culture did not contain some known human pathogens. There was no information addressing the possibility of pathogenicity to marine species. On February 19, 1991, Alpha Environmental terminated discussions and their proposal was reviewed by the subcommittee using all the available information and the draft protocol for bioremediation proposal review.

Regarding the issue of "Enthusiastic Support" contained in the second paragraph, neither Dr. Al-Gain nor Prince Fahd share the stated "enthusiasm." During an overflight on February 21, 1991 with Dr. Al-Gain, Captain Jensen discussed the issue of bioremediation with him at length. Dr. Al-Gain's concern centers around the introduction of non-indigenous micro-organisms into the Arabian Gulf. The Gulf experiences a tremendous number of oil spills annually and has built up a very active indigenous micro-organism population. He is concerned over the long-term

effects of the added micro organisms. In a meeting February 16, 1991 with Prince Fahd, the Vice Governor of the Eastern Province, Dr. Tawfiq, Dr. Dabbagh, and Captain Jensen, Prince Fahd raised the issue of bioremediation. Dr. Tawfiq shared the same concern expressed by Dr. Al-Gain, Prince Fahd appeared to concur completely.

The third paragraph alleges that LCDR Petrae, NOAA, Dr. Bill Lehr, NOAA, and Mr. Bob Caron, EPA, have mounted a negative effort to block a trial deployment. Other than attending the first Bioremediation Subcommittee meeting, Dr. Lehr and Mr. Caron have had no direct input into the issue. As mentioned above, LCDR Petrae and Dr. Peter Hinchcliffe have been involved, in an advisory role, in the activities of the subcommittee. The Bioremediation Subcommittee, has been developing a protocol to be applied in the certification of any one of the many bioremediation proposals received to date. Dr. Dabbagh, has on several occasions expressed his appreciation to Captain Jensen for the positive contributions and professionalism shown by both LCDR Petrae and Dr. Hinchcliffe.

With respect to paragraph four, it is Captain Jensen's strong impression that the entire senior response organization staff, including Dr. Al-Gain, Dr. Tawfiq and Dr. Dabbagh, is professionally comfortable with the Saudi strategy for certification and use protocols in final development concerning the bioremediation issue.

The Saudis are clearly developing their own policy guidance concerning bioremediation. The International Interagency Assessment Team, through its U.S. and U.K. members, is merely providing input based on professional knowledge and collective experience. In my opinion, the Saudis are to be applauded for their deliberate and professional approach to dealing with this controversial issue in a technical and no-political manner.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
DIVISION

TELECOPIER COVER SHEET

TIME: 1200
DATE: 2/21/91NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING
THIS PAGE: 2TO: Steve DanzanskyFROM: Bill Holt

PHONE: _____

PHONE: 267-0518

SUBJ: This is the memo that was delivered to us last night by Dan Kuykendahl (ex Cong.). He said he was going to give it to the White House (Gov. Simon's name was mentioned). I understand a copy was also given to EPA HQ. Jensen's report will probably be faxed to us tomorrow A.M.

COMMENTS REQUESTED BY: _____

THE NUMBER FOR THIS FASCIMILE MACHINE IS (202) 267-4085

Alpha Environmental

517 3rd Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003
202/546-2196

ALPHA

REQUEST DELIVERY OF THIS INFORMATION TO PRESIDENT BUSH

Dr. Kuykendall

20 February, 1991

In response to the recent oil spills in the Persian Gulf, Alpha - EmTech Environmental Services, a Texas company, has fielded a substantial and experienced team equipped to apply the Alpha Bio-Sea bioremediation technology. Alpha - EmTech have provided full technical documentation, proof of non toxicity, and examples of the acclaimed Alpha - EmTech treatment of the Mega Borg and Apex tanker spills in the Gulf of Mexico during 1990. The team has been in the country for three weeks.

This major U. S. private sector initiative has received the full and enthusiastic support of Dr. Abdulbar al-Gain, the head of the Saudi EPA, and enjoys the sponsorship of Prince Fahd ibn Salmen ibn Abdul Aziz, the Vice Governor of the Eastern Province.

Despite strong support from the Saudis, Mr. Gary Petrae and Mr. Bill Lehr of NOAA and Mr. Bob Caron of EPA, members of the U. S. Advisory team have exceeded their mandate and mounted a strong and highly negative effort to block the trial deployment of the Alpha BioSea on a test section of the spill. The negative actions of the NOAA and EPA representatives stand in stark contrast to the highly positive and constructive round-the-clock work being performed by the U. S. Coast Guard in the area.

Senior Saudis involved in combatting the spill are astonished and highly disquieted by the NOAA and EPA campaign which they interpret as "The U. S. government undercutting their own people." Repeatedly, the Alpha - EmTech team have been told that "These (NOAA and EPA) people have been sent by the President of the United States. If they do not want to use bioremediation, it must be because the U. S. has a reason which you have not told us. Why can't your own people support you?" The NOAA and EPA representatives are putting the USG in the position of ruling on an internal Saudi matter. Is Washington moving to take principal responsibility for the selection of new technologies for the Persian Gulf spill?

There is not other technology which offers equivalent promise. Moreover, the United States stands to gain export earnings in excess of \$400 million over a one year period in addition to establishing a leading role in a growth industry worldwide.

CLOSE HOLD

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY

SUBJECT: Follow-on: Domestic Policy and Consequence
Management

When we spoke about a week ago concerning our readiness for civil defense and domestic policy consequence management, you suggested that you thought a meeting with Brent Scowcroft might be appropriate to further explore this issue. You also indicated that you thought a mechanism was in place analagous to the 1988 National System for Emergency Coordination, which system was suggested in a 1988 memo from Ed Meese to the Domestic Policy Council, a copy of which is attached.

I have asked my staff to explore this question with FEMA and their preliminary answer seems to be that while the statutory authority exists for "emergency" relief under the 1988 amendments to the Stafford Act (versus merely natural disaster relief), and while there is a disaster relief mechanism in place which could deal with state and local demands, the center of the puzzle still appears to be missing as well as a few of the specific parts.

By way of example:

--The 1988 National System for Emergency Coordination with a National Coordinator, lead agency functions and clear designations of responsibility is neither operational nor funded. It is no more than a DPC memorandum from a prior administration. There remains a need for the White House to clearly designate a mechanism or system for preparing for and coordinating responses to domestic emergencies which may occur in the event of a Middle East conflict. If that mechanism is FEMA, then so be it.

--In any event, in my opinion, that system needs to be tested, supervised and/or coordinated from the White House. The fact that the Stafford Act provides the authority and funding does not mean that the system is either fully operational or understood to be the vehicle for exercising this function. The White House needs to understand its capabilities and deficiencies as well as the peculiar character of the response which might be necessary in the event of war.

--Wherever the delegation of authority may rest, our discussions with FEMA have revealed several major interstices in emergency preparedness in the event of a conflagration in the Gulf:

1. Response to chemical or biological terrorism
2. Availability of military personnel or resources for domestic use.
3. Potential shortage or interruption in energy supplies as a result of terrorist activities, allocation to military use etc.

I do believe that a meeting with Brent would be useful at this point and I will report to you on the results when it is arranged.

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

19 January 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: National System for Emergency Coordination

Pursuant to Domestic Policy Council meetings on this subject, the President has approved a National System for Emergency Coordination. The system's purpose, principles, activation and operational responsibilities are outlined in the attachment to this memorandum. Department and agency heads are encouraged to ensure that organizations and staff members are prepared to carry out their respective operational responsibilities.


Edwin Meese III
Chairman Pro Tempore

12/34
36/mj

NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EMERGENCY COORDINATION

Purpose: The National System for Emergency Coordination is a mechanism for ensuring that the Federal Government provides timely, effective, and coordinated assistance to States and local governments in extreme catastrophic technological, natural or other domestic disasters of national significance. Responsibilities currently assigned to Federal departments and agencies by statute or other authority, and existing emergency management systems and capabilities are an integral part of this response system and will be used when possible.

Principles:

(a) The primary responsibility for public health and safety in the event of a domestic emergency resides with the States. For certain extreme emergencies (i.e., those requiring coordinated action by a number of agencies or immediate relief to a widespread area) Federal responses are mandated by statute, or may otherwise be appropriate.

(b) The Federal Government may provide support in life saving and life protecting operations when requested by State or local governments, or when otherwise appropriate. Assistance may be provided directly to a local government in cooperation with the State government.

(c) Federal assistance will ordinarily be provided by Federal regional offices and field elements, such as disaster field offices, located nearest to the crisis site.

(d) The Federal Government's response to major domestic crises will be consistent with current emergency plans, and existing domestic and national security crisis information and management systems will be used.

System Activation: When an extreme emergency occurs, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) official responsible for Cabinet affairs will consult with the National Security Council and appropriate Executive Branch departments and agencies to develop specific action plans for consideration by the President,

the Cabinet and other officials as necessary. Only the President may activate the system. If he does, the Cabinet Affairs Office will be responsible for apprising the President of developments and decisions that may be needed.

Operational Responsibilities:

(a) Federal departments and agencies shall respond to potential crises in their respective areas of cognizance.

(b) Federal interagency functional groups.

(1) Federal interagency functional groups will be established to support and coordinate relief operations in extreme emergencies, consistent with those currently called for in existing emergency plans such as the Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake. These groups will assess problems, propose solutions, and facilitate resolution of specific emergency functional needs.

(2) Lead agencies have been designated for each functional group on the basis of recognized leadership roles, resources, inherent authorities, and/or relevant expertise.

(3) To the extent possible under existing authorities, interagency functional groups will also, in their respective areas of cognizance: conduct risk assessments; identify and prioritize contingencies for which emergency plans are needed; provide external liaison and situation assessments; and test Federal emergency response structures and plans.

(4) Interagency functional groups will be established to facilitate communications, economic affairs, energy, human services, legal and law enforcement, transportation and other functions needed to mitigate the crisis. Leadership and membership are to be based on statutes, Executive Orders, interagency agreements, and logical extensions of normal responsibilities.

(c) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be prepared to consult with and assist Federal departments and agencies in planning for and responding to all types of emergencies, as listed below.

(d) National Coordinator.

(1) The President may designate a National Coordinator as his representative to coordinate Federal support operations during extreme emergencies.

(2) The National Coordinator would ordinarily be a senior official of a department or agency having assigned responsibilities for the following specified types of emergencies:

Natural disasters.....	FEMA
Health or medical.....	DHHS
Terrorism..... (less airborne hijacking)	DOJ
Energy.....	DOE
Nuclear weapon, reactor, facility accident.....	DOE or DOD ("owner")
Accident at licensed nuclear power plant.....	NRC
Environmental..... (less some water related incidents but including chemical plant accidents)	EPA
Transportation..... (including airborne hijacking and some water related environmental incidents)	DOT
Economic disruption.....	TREAS
Telecommunications.....	OSTP/NCS

(3) Based on the nature of the crisis, the National Coordinator would determine which interagency functional groups should be activated.

(e) Federal Coordinating Officer.

(1) One or more Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO) may be appointed as the President's on-scene representative(s) when necessary. The FCO would ordinarily be a senior field official of the same Federal department or agency as the National Coordinator, and would be responsible for coordinating the Federal response at the emergency site(s).

(2) FCOs would report to the National Coordinator.

(3) Based on the nature of the crisis, the FCO(s) would determine appropriate regional functional groups to be activated.

(f) State Coordination.

(1) If the President activates the system, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency will notify the Governors of affected States and territories about the Federal Government's plan of action.

(2) The National Coordinator or an FCO may ask the Governor of a State requesting Federal assistance to appoint a State Coordinating Officer to coordinate State and local government response efforts with those of the Federal Government.

(3) States would be expected to interact with FCOs to indicate their need for Federal assistance, and to coordinate the use of Federal assistance.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo with Attachment	From Daniel Casse to Ede Holiday Re: Use of investigational products by troops deployed to Operation Desert Shield (4 pp.)	12/4/90	(b)(1), P-5	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Domestic Policy Council
Series: Schulteiss, Dean
Subseries: Subject File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Iraqi Oil Spill [2]

Date Closed: 8/4/1998 **OA/ID Number:** CF00533-007

FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From Ede Holiday to John Sununu Re: Domestic policy and consequence management of a U.S.- Iraqi military engagement (2 pp.)	12/7/90	(b)(1), P-5	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Domestic Policy Council
Series: Schulteiss, Dean
Subseries: Subject File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Iraqi Oil Spill [2]

Date Closed: 8/4/1998	OA/ID Number: CF00533-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

From: CAPT William F. Holt, USCG
Chief, Marine Environmental Protection Division

7 Mar 91

To:	<u>Agency</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>FAX</u>
	White House Situation Room	Steve Danzansky	202-456-2223
	D.O.E.	Mr. John Easton "SDO"	202-586-0420
	D.O.S.	Bob Blumberg/ Tucker Scully Oil Spill Task Force-Scully/Blumberg	202-647-6610
	DOD Crisis Coord Center	Joe Muckerman	703-697-1920
	JCS Crisis Action Team	BGen John Jumper	703-697-4801
	USACoE EOC	Gary Campbell/ John Elmore	202-272-0378
	EPA Emerg. Ops Cntr	Jim Makris	202-252-0154
	IMO	CDR Pascoe	011-44-071-587-3238
	Canadian Coast Guard	Mr. Tom Ring	613-998-4168
	CAPT Viglienzzone	U.S. Coast Guard	703-693-6465
	U.S. Coast Guard Congressional Affairs	CAPT Hull	202-366-2351

Attached are four pages of oil spill overflight and trajectory analysis information.

UNCLASSIFIED**6 MARCH****Overflight Morning Saudi Time**

Overflight operations were again hampered by poor weather. Three separate overflights were conducted. The area covered by the SLAR is shown on the attached map. A C-12 flew over Kuwaiti waters, an additional overflight (unknown aircraft type) covered the Saudi coastline and the area around Harqus Island.

Kuwait to Saudi: A large patch of sheen appears off of Mina al Ahmadi extending from the shoreline out approximately 40 miles. This patch contains numerous streamers of mousse approximately 15 miles offshore. There is also oil identified in the SLAR extending near the shore down as far as Ra's al Khafji.

Saudi Waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil remain along the coast between Ra's al Tanaqib and Abu Ali Island. The SLAR identified a patch about 15 miles long approximately 10 miles east of Ra's al Khafji. Additional patches and streamers of mousse were found in the offshore island area (near Harquis, Karan and Kurayn Islands).

Again, due to adverse weather, we expect that some floating oil may not have been reported - tomorrow's weather should allow for more complete overflight information.

In addition to overflight information, field personnel have confirmed at least seven sources that continue leaking oil (most of them at low rates). These sources are:

- 1) Mina Su'ud refinery (est. 10's barrels/day)
- 2) Mina al Ahmadi refiner (est. 10's barrels/day)
- 3) Sea Island Terminal (est. 10's barrels/day)
- 4) Al Bakr, South Terminal (est. 10's barrels/day)
- 5) Vessel at Al Bakr, South Terminal (minimal flushing)
- 6) Vessel at industrial complex below Mina Shuaybah (minimal flushing)
- 7) Unidentified source, origin presumed to be between Bubiyan Island and the Peninsula (volume larger than above sources)

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Gulf Spill Trajectory Update

On March 3 observational data indicated two patches of oil offshore of Abu Ali, one to the NE and one almost due E. These two patches were not observed on March 4. Poor weather prevented reliable observations in this area on March 5 and 6. Because the two patches of oil observed off of Abu Ali on March 3 could pose a threat to the Jubayl area, we have prepared a trajectory that assumes there is a patch in that area.

This trajectory includes the observational data from March 5 and 6 AND an additional patch of oil off of Abu Ali. This additional patch is shown on the trajectory map even though it was not observed on March 6.

Oil offshore of Kuwait is expected to move to the south, with additional beach impacts along the Kuwaiti shore, particularly in the afternoons. During flood tides, small amounts of oil may move into Kuwait Harbor.


The oil that is offshore near Harqus Island will also move towards the south, leading to potential oil impacts on some of the offshore islands as it transits the area.

Given the N and NW winds that are forecast, we would expect the oil near the Saudi coast to remain where it is. Subsurface oil has been observed in the nearshore region. We would expect that this will continue, leading to the formation of tarmats.


If there is oil offshore of Abu Ali Island, given present and forecast weather conditions, we would not anticipate any impact in the Jubayl area through March 12. We would expect this oil to move mostly to the south and east.

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File 0.1 sm11

CRISIS ACTION CENTER

TELEFAX

U.S. Department
of Transportation
United States
Coast Guard



TODAY'S DATE 3/5/91 TIME OF TRANSMISSION _____

THIS WILL BE A TRANSMISSION OF 3 PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET

TO: MR. STEVE DANZANSKY

COMPANY/UNIT: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PHONE: 202-395-1206

FROM: CDR LENTSCH

USCG HEADQUARTERS

PHONE: 267-0440

LOCATED: U. S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS
ROOM 2611 (CAO)
2100 SECOND STREET, SW
WASHINGTON, DC 20593-0001

PHONE: (FTS) 267-2101
FAX: (FTS) 267-2107

MAILING ADDRESS:

U.S. Department
of Transportation

United States
Coast Guard



PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL (U)
SITREP 27
05 MAR 1991

1. (U) International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. (U) Conducted two SLAR overflights. Winds were calm during the morning flight and resultant data received was poor. The winds picked up in the afternoon and good spill data was obtained. Visually checked terminals in Kuwait for new leakage, none noted.

B. (U) Captain Luchun, LCDR Keane, Jay Rodstein (NOAA), along with Captain Mowery (USCG Marlo) flew to Mina al Almadi, Kuwait (south of Kuwait City) on board a US Navy helo to obtain oil samples and provide advice on diver ops in the oil-fouled terminal area. Also, evaluated oil well fire situation for meteorological purposes. Oil and water samples are being processed by King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM).

2. (U) Other Government's Requests for Assistance: NTR

3. (U) Fish and Wildlife Issues:

A. (U) Don Kane (USF&WS) created and circulated a shoreline evaluation report for Jana Island. He then presented his plan at the daily scientific advisory meeting along with details of his site visit at KFUPM. Mr. Kane also participated in two meetings to discuss and develop a wildlife response plan to be presented to the European Community as a proposal for funding wildlife efforts regarding the oil spill.

4. (U) International Efforts: NTR

5. (U) Spill Information:

A. (U) Overflight Data 4 March 91:

1. (U) Reports from two overflights were available today. A SLAR aircraft covered the central Gulf and a CH-53 helo concentrated on the near shore area of the Saudi Arabian coast and the northern Gulf. Although no new areas of floating oil were observed today, light wind conditions resulted in larger areas of sheen. This is a typical phenomena, as the wind speed decreases, the sheen becomes thinner and covers a larger area.

PERSIAN GULF SPILL (U)
SITREP 27
05 MAR 1991

2. (U) Kuwait to Saudi Arabia: Bands of mousse were reported just east of Faylakah Island trending to the southeast. These bands were within an area approximately 30 miles long and 5-10 miles wide. Another series of bands of mousse with associated sheen patches were reported approximately 10-12 miles offshore between Mina al Ahmadi and Mina Su'ud. In addition to the continuing small amount of sheen around the terminal at Al Bakr, a sheen with some small mousse patches was reported at the Sea Island Terminal. No oil was reported near Bubiyan Island today.

3. (U) Saudi Arabian waters: Heavy concentrations of oil remain near the coastline between Ras al Khafji and Abu Ali, with the heaviest concentrations between Abu Ali Island and Ra's al Tanajib. Offshore sheen was reported as more ubiquitous, the easternmost sheen patch was reported about 90 miles east of Ra's al Ghar. A small patch of sheen was observed just off the tip of Abu Ali, hooking in to the southwest.

B. (U) Spill Trajectory Update: The trajectory is not significantly different than the previous 3 March update. Winds are expected to start coming from the ESE to SE by 5 March. The expected onshore winds will again threaten coastal areas that have floating oil just off shore. These onshore winds will be intensified during anticipated sea breeze periods the afternoons of 5 and 6 March. After 6 March, winds are forecast to once again switch to the N and NNW.

6. (U) Future spill potential: NTR

7. (U) Other Pertinent Information: NTR

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TELEFAX

U.S. Department
of Transportation
United States
Coast Guard



TODAY'S DATE 6 Mar 91 TIME OF TRANSMISSION 1625

THIS WILL BE A TRANSMISSION OF 4 PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET

TO: MR. STEVE DANZANSKY

COMPANY/UNIT: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PHONE: 202-395-1206

FROM: CDR LENTSCH

USCG HEADQUARTERS

PHONE: 267-0440

LOCATED: U. S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS
ROOM 2611 (CAC)
2100 SECOND STREET, SW
WASHINGTON, DC 20593-0001

PHONE: (FTS) 267-2101
FAX: (FTS) 267-2107

PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL (U)
SITREP 28
06 MAR 1991

1. (U) International Interagency Assessment Team (IIAT) Report:

A. (U) AIREYE data has been extremely valuable. Particularly when weather is too severe or smoke so dense that visual observations not possible.

B. (U) Weather on-scene (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as far South as Dhahran) over the past 48 hours has been inclement. A storm front has passed through shifting winds from northerly to southeasterly. Winds on 5 March were SE at 25 knots with gusts to 35. Sandstorms prevalent to the north with intermittent heavy rain. Localized street flooding occurred. Since oil is typically driven by wind vice ocean current, expect oil in this area to have relocated to shorelines with SE exposure.

C. (U) Dense smoke clouds previously over Saudi Arabia are now over Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran due to wind shift.

D. (U) M/V AL WAASIT (skimmer vessel contracted by Aramco) continues to recover oil offshore where/when located. No shoreline recovery ops observed at Ras Az Zawr yesterday and a significantly less amount of oil was observed on the shoreline than on previous day. Suspect wind drove oil offshore.

E. (U) Coast Guard and NOAA reps met with NAVOCEAN and NAVCENT to discuss cleanup progress and remote sensing.

F. (U) CAPT Luchun met with U.S. Consulate staff in Dhahran and discussed cleanup issues. LCDR Keane prepared input for inclusion in a U.S. Consulate report.

2. (U) Other Government's Requests for Assistance: NTR.

3. (U) Fish and Wildlife Issues: Don Kane continues to work with International and Saudi Wildlife Representatives to assess oil impacts, oversee wildlife rescue efforts, and develop appropriate shoreline cleanup protocols for sensitive habitat areas.

PERSIAN GULF SPILL (U)
SITREP 28
06 MAR 1991

4. (U) International Efforts:

A. (U) International and Saudi Arabian community interest and support, catalyzed by IIAT involvement, has increased significantly and is assisting in driving response efforts.

B. (U) CG Reps accompanied 3 officials from BAPCO (Bahrain) and two from Australian government on C-12 coastal overflight North to Kuwait, Mina Al Almahdi Terminal. BAPCO officials pleased with flight and level of cooperation. Australian official expressed familiar dismay with lack of cleanup so far.

5. (U) Spill Information: 5 March 1991

A. (U) Overflight operations hampered by poor weather today. A helicopter (CH-46) overflight of nearshore Saudi waters was completed successfully. A SLAR overflight was also attempted in the morning, this flight was cut short by the weather. Four separate offshore oil sightings were identified by the SLAR, there may have been additional areas of oil that were obscured by the SLAR imagery.

B. (U) Kuwait to Saudi Arabia: The SLAR indicated that there are three small patches of oil approximately 20 miles east of Bubiyan Island. The SLAR also identified a patch from Mina al Ahmadi to Mina Su'ud extending from nearshore out 10-15 miles.

C. (U) Saudi Arabian waters: The heaviest concentrations of oil remain between Ra's al Tanaqib and Abu Ali Island. As a result of onshore winds, the slick that has been along the Saudi coastline does not extend as far east as it has on previously days. Only one patch was identified by the SLAR in the offshore waters. This offshore patch is approximately 35 miles long and 3-10 miles wide.

D. (U) There appear to be at least six sources that continue leaking oil. Confirmation of this is anticipated within the next several days. The apparent sources have been identified as follows.

1. (U) Mina Suud refinery - est 10's bbl/day
2. (U) Mina Alhamadi refinery - est 10's bbl/day
3. (U) Sea Island Terminal - est 10's bbl/day
4. (U) Al Bakar, S. Terminal - est 10's bbl/day
5. (U) Vessel at Al Bakar, S. Terminal - minimal flushing

PERSIAN GULF SPILL (U)
SITREP 28
06 MAR 1991

6. (U) Vessel at industrial complex immediately below Mina Shuaybah - minimal flushing

7. (U) Unidentified source, origin expected to be between Bubiyan Island and peninsula - volume is larger than any other single source.

6. (U) Future spill potential:

A. (U) The overflight and weather information available today does not significantly alter the previous trajectory estimate. The trajectory from 4 March remains valid.

7. (U) Other Pertinent Information:

A. (U) LCDR Keane to accompany Dr. David Olsen and ABC News Cameraman to Abu Ali Island to facilitate filming of cleanup ops in progress.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Report	U.S. Coast Guard Report--Persian Gulf Oil Spill (5 pp.)	3/4/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Domestic Policy Council
Series: Schulteiss, Dean
Subseries: Subject File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Iraqi Oil Spill [2]

Date Closed: 8/4/1998 FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: CF00533-007 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: MR Disposition: MR Disposition Date:
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

From: CAPT William F. Holt, USCG
Chief, Marine Environmental Protection Division

6 Mar 91

To:	<u>Agency</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>FAX</u>
	White House Situation Room	Steve Danzansky	202-456-2223
	D.O.E.	Mr. John Easton "SDO"	202-586-0420
	D.O.S.	Bob Blumberg/ Tucker Scully Oil Spill Task Force-Scully/Blumberg	202-647-6610
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	Canadian Coast Guard	Mr. Tom Ring	613-998-4168
	CAPT Viglienzzone	U.S. Coast Guard	703-693-6465
	U.S. Coast Guard Congressional Affairs	CAPT Hull	202-366-2351

Attached are four pages of oil spill overflight information.

CAC

CDR LENTSCH

5 MARCH**UNCLASSIFIED****Overflight Morning Saudi Time**

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In addition to overflight information, field personnel have confirmed at least six sources that continue leaking oil (most of them at low rates).


Gulf Spill Trajectory Update

NO NEW TRAJECTORY MAP WAS PREPARED TODAY.

The overflight and weather information available today does not significantly alter the previous trajectory estimate. The trajectory from yesterday (4 March) remains valid.

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**INTERNATIONAL INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT TEAM
SITREP 36
06 MARCH 1991**

1. SITUATION:

A. WX O/S (KUWAIT AND S.A. AS FAR SOUTH AS DHARHAN) OVER PAST 48 HOURS HAS BEEN INCLEMENT. A STORM FRONT HAS PASSED THROUGH SHIFTING WINDS FROM NORTHERLY TO SOUTHEASTERLY. WINDS ON 5 MARCH WERE SE AT 25 KTS WITH GUSTS TO 35. SANDSTORMS PREVALENT TO THE NORTH WITH INTERMITTENT TO HEAVY RAIN. LOCALIZED STREET FLOODING OCCURED. SINCE OIL IS TYPICALLY DRIVEN BY WIND VICE OCEAN CURRENT IN THIS AREA...EXPECT OIL TO HAVE RELOCATED TO SHORELINES WITH SE EXPOSURE.

B. M/V AL WAASIT (SKIMMER VSL CONTRACTED BY ARAMCO) CONTINUES TO RECOVER OIL OFFSHORE WHERE/WHEN LOCATED. NO SHORELINE RECOVERY OPS OBSERVED AT RAS AZ ZAWR YESTERDAY AND A SIGNIFICANTLY LESS AMOUNT OF OIL WAS OBSERVED ON THE SHORELINE THAN ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. SUSPECT WIND DROVE OIL OFFSHORE.

C. INTERNATIONAL AND SAUDI ARABIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY INTEREST AND SUPPORT, CATALYZED BY IIAT INVOLVEMENT, HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY AND IS ASSISTING IN DRIVING RESPONSE EFFORTS.

D. DENSE SMOKE CLOUDS PREVIOUSLY OVER SAUDI ARABIA AND BAHRAIN ARE NOW OVER KUWAIT, IRAQ, AND IRAN DUE TO WIND SHIFT.

2. ACTION:

A. CAPT LUCHUN, CDR SECHLER (CO CGRON 2), AND JAY RODSTEIN MET WITH THE NAVOCEANO AND VADM ARTHUR (NAVCENT) ON BOARD THE USS BLUE RIDGE TO DISCUSS CLEANUP PROGRESS AND REMOTE SENSING.

B. LCDR KEANE CONTINUED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL PLAN REVIEW FOR INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. CLEANUP PROPOSALS. PREPARED OIL SPILL INPUT FOR INCLUSION IN U.S. CONSULATE "AFTER WAR REPORT".

C. CDR SCHRINNER AND LCDR KEANE ATTEMPTED TO VISIT MUSULAMEYAH/KHARSANIYA IMPACT AREA BUT ABORTED MISSION DUE TO A SEVERE SANDSTORM. VISITED RAS AZ ZAWR CLEANUP SITE.

D. CAPT LUCHUN MET WITH U.S. CONSULATE STAFF IN DHARHAN TO DISCUSS VARIOUS ISSUES.

E. JAY RODSTEIN OBSERVED AND CONDUCTED PHOTO RECON ON SLAR FLIGHT.

F. CDR SCHRINNER ACCOMPANIED 3 OFFICIALS FROM BAPCO (BAHRAIN) AND 2 FROM AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ON C-12 COASTAL OVERFLIGHT NORTH TO KUWAIT, MINA AL ALMAHDI TERMINAL. BAPCO OFFICIALS PLEASED WITH FLIGHT AND LEVEL OF COOPERATION. AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL SOMEWHAT

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DISMAYED WITH LACK OF CLEANUP SO FAR.

G. DON KANE CONTINUES TO WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL AND SAUDI WILDLIFE REPRESENTATIVES TO ASSESS OIL IMPACTS, OVERSEE WILDLIFE RESCUE EFFORTS, AND DEVELOP APPROPRIATE SHORELINE CLEANUP PROTOCOLS FOR SENSITIVE HABITAT AREAS.

3. FUTURE PLANS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. PROVIDE OVERFLIGHT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY REPS AS AVAILABLE AND APPROPRIATE.

B. AIREYE DATA HAS BEEN EXTREMELY VALUABLE. PARTICULARLY WHEN WX IS TOO SEVERE OR SMOKE IS SO DENSE THAT VISUAL OBSERVATION IS NOT POSSIBLE.

C. LCDR KEANE TO ACCOMPANY DR. DAVID OLSEN AND ABC NEWS CAMERAMAN TO ABU ALI ISLAND TO FACILITATE FILMING OF CLEANUP OPS IN PROGRESS.

4. CAPT LUCHUN, USCG SENDS.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Cable	From U.S. Embassy, Riyadh to SECSTATE Re: Saddam's Inferno: 3/3 Oil Fires Briefing at Diplomatic Institute (2 pp.)	3/4/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Domestic Policy Council
Series: Schulteiss, Dean
Subseries: Subject File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Iraqi Oil Spill [2]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By RA (NLGB) on 11/9/1999

Date Closed:	8/4/1998	OA/ID Number:	CF00533-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0099-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	98-0099-F/1(57)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Full	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	11/9/1999	MR Disposition Date:	

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File 0.1 sm V

<DIST>

PRT: SIT

SIT: CHARLES HAASS DEAL MELBY SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHRH <DTG> 041407Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8033

INFO RUEADOE/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 8238

RUCNCM/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0032

RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT //CCJ2//

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0420

<SUBJ> SADDAM'S INFERNO: 3/3 OIL FIRES BRIEFING AT
DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTE

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 02215

BLACKGOLD

DEPT ALSO FOR OES/OSP - T. SCULLY AND NEA/RA - G. DORRIS

DEPT ALSO FOR M/MED - DR. PROOST

DOE FOR IE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: CASC, EAGR, EPET, SENV, KU, IZ, SA, US, XF

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S INFERNO: 3/3 OIL FIRES BRIEFING AT
DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTE

REF: RIYADH 2052

1. (U) ON SUNDAY, MARCH 3, U.S. NAVAL CAPTAIN CRAIG KOPSTAIN GAVE AN ENCORE PERFORMANCE OF HIS EXCELLENT BRIEFING ON THE CONFLAGRATION OF KUWAITI OIL FACILITIES TO SAG OFFICIALS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTE. BRIEFING MATERIAL WHICH HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED, AS WELL AS INFORMATION FROM SAG AGENCIES ATTENDING THE BRIEFING, FOLLOWS.

2. (S) FIRES: CAPTAIN KOPSTAIN DESCRIBED THE HISTORY OF THE OIL WELL FIRES:

DATE	WELLS ABLAZE
------	--------------

FEB 12	20
FEB 20	61
FEB 22	179
FEB 23	191
FEB 24	220 PLUS
FEB 26 (LAST COUNT)	516.

3. (S) ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, MORE THAN 600 FACILITIES, INCLUDING OIL WELLS, MANIFOLDS, BROKEN PIPELINES, REFINERIES, STORAGE FACILITIES, AND SEA ISLAND TERMINALS WERE ALIGHT. THE MINA AL SAUD REFINERY HAS BEEN DESTROYED, AND IN IRAQ, THE IPSA I AND IPSA II PIPELINES HAVE BEEN PUT OUT OF COMMISSION. SINCE FEBRUARY 27, POOR WEATHER AND HEAVY OIL SMOKE HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO GARNER MORE ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT FACILITIES HAD BEEN DAMAGED OR WERE ON FIRE.

4. (S) GASES: AT A DISTANCE OF 1000 YARDS FROM THE WELLS, ACCORDING TO KOPSTAIN, HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS HAS BEEN MEASURED AT CONCENTRATIONS AS HIGH AS 10,000 TO 20,000 PARTS PER MILLION (PPM); AS LITTLE AS 400 TO 600 PPM IS LETHAL. A HEALTH MINISTRY OFFICIAL ADDED THAT HIS

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PER E.O. 12958

2.23.00 CF

98.0098.F

MINISTRY HAS MONITORED LEVELS OF SULFUR DIOXIDE AS HIGH AS 3.013 MILLIGRAMS PER CUBIC METER AS FAR AWAY AS AL KHAFJI, THE COASTAL SAUDI-KUWAITI BORDER CROSSING POINT. (COMMENT: THIS CONCENTRATION OF SULFUR DIOXIDE IS EQUIVALENT TO A POLLUTION STANDARD INDEX VALUE IN EXCESS OF 500, INDICATING A POTENTIAL OF "SIGNIFICANT HARM" AS A RESULT OF EXPOSURE. END COMMENT).

5. (C) SMOKE: CAPTAIN KOPSTAIN SAID THAT THE HUGE SMOKE CLOUD SPAWNED BY THE FIRES HAD COME AS FAR WEST AS RIYADH TWICE IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. ON SUNDAY, MARCH 3, SMOKE WAS DRIFTING SOUTH OF THE CITY. (COMMENT: THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH AN UNUSUAL DARK SMUDGE WE HAVE SEEN ON THE HORIZON OFF-AND-ON DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS. END COMMENT). CAPTAIN KOPSTAIN ADDED THAT BLACK RAIN HAS BEEN REPORTED IN TURKEY, SYRIA, IRAN, AND AFGHANISTAN IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS.

6. (C) ANIMALS: DR. ABDULBAR AL-GAIN, PRESIDENT OF THE METEOROLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION (MEPA), SAID THAT A JOINT MEPA - WILDLIFE - HEALTH - PETROLEUM - INTERIOR TEAM WAS COMBING THE DESERT SOUTHWEST OF KHAFJI, IN RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF ANIMAL DEATHS (NFI) IN THE OUTBACK.

7. (C) SOIL: THE JOINT TEAM IS ALSO TAKING SOIL SAMPLES FOR ACIDITY LEVELS ANALYSIS. AL-GAIN SAID THAT SO FAR ALL SAMPLES ARE WITHIN NORMAL PH LEVELS.

8. (C) ACID RAIN: CAPTAIN KOPSTAIN WARNED THAT ACID RAIN, FORMED BY SULFIDES AND NITRIDES CONDENSING IN THE ATMOSPHERE, COULD AFFECT AREAS WHERE THE OILY SMOKE PERSISTED OVER TIME. A MEPA OFFICIAL REPLIED THAT MEPA

BT

#2215

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 RIYADH 02215

BLACKGOLD

DEPT ALSO FOR OES/OSP - T. SCULLY AND NEA/RA - G. DORRIS

DEPT ALSO FOR M/MED - DR. PROOST

DOE FOR IE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: CASC, EAGR, EPET, SENV, KU, IZ, SA, US, XF

SUBJECT: SADDAM'S INFERNO: 3/3 OIL FIRES BRIEFING AT COMPUTER MODELS SUGGEST THAT CARBONATES BORNE ALOFT BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF SAND PARTICLES TYPICAL OF THE DESERT ATMOSPHERE WOULD NEUTRALIZE SOME OF THE ACID RAIN - AT LEAST IN THE GULF.

9. (C) PEOPLE: A SAUDI CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICIAL ASKED HOW TO PROTECT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS FROM BEING HARMED BY ACID RAIN, TOXIC GASES, OR RESPIRATORY AILMENTS RESULTING FROM HEAVY PARTICULATE FALLOUT. CAPTAIN KOPSTAIN REPLIED THAT PUTTING THE FIRES OUT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE BEST DEFENSE. HE ADDED THAT CIVIL DEFENSE MIGHT WISH TO MONITOR ON A SPOT BASIS INDIVIDUALS WITH CHRONIC RESPIRATORY PROBLEMS, AS AN EARLY WARNING OF HIGH PARTICULATE OR GAS CONCENTRATIONS.

10. (U) DOHA, KUWAIT, USCINCCENT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

FREEMAN

BT

#2215

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 2215 <TOR> 910304093316 MSG000289387996

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 2215 <TOR> 910304091200 MSG000289386720

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Report	Coast Guard Report--Persian Gulf Oil Spill (2 pp.)	3/1/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Domestic Policy Council
Series: Schulteiss, Dean
Subseries: Subject File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Iraqi Oil Spill [2]

Date Closed:	8/4/1998	OA/ID Number:	CF00533-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0099-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Report	Coast Guard Report--Persian Gulf Oil Spill (3 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Domestic Policy Council

Series: Schulteiss, Dean

Subseries: Subject File

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Iraqi Oil Spill [2]

Date Closed: 8/4/1998

OA/ID Number: CF00533-007

FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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